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Lockouts in the Netherlands: Why Statistics on La-
bour Disputes Must Discriminate Between Strikes 
and Lockouts, and Why New Statistics Need to Be 
Compiled 
Sjaak van der Velden ∗ 
Abstract: Lockouts are a phenomenon greatly underestima-
ted in research into labour relations. Despite the ILO recom-
mendations many national statistical bureaus do not make a 
distinction between strikes and lockouts. This practice leads 
to false conclusions about workers’ behaviour. After all, 
strikes and lockouts are two sides of the medal of labour re-
lations but really two different sides. Strikes are a weapon 
of workers, whereas lockouts can be a means by which em-
ployers force their workers into a certain direction. The data 
on labour relations should therefore discriminate between 
strikes and lockouts. Because the official data often neglect 
this, it may be necessary to do own research into the sub-
ject. This article shows the argument for discrimination tak-
ing the Netherlands as an example with some references to 
other countries. 
Lockouts as a weapon of capital 
Between March and September 2003 the management of the Golden Reach 
factory in Calcutta, India, locked out 1,400 of its workers in response to strikes 
called in protest at plans to reorganize the company. The Golden Reach factory 
is a subsidiary of Unilever, an Anglo-Dutch conglomerate. Unilever has never 
declared a lockout in the Netherlands. The conglomerate seems to have differ-
ent policies towards labour, depending on the country in which it operates. 
Another example illustrates this difference on a more global scale. The English 
search engine of ‘www.labourstart.org’ returns 62 hits for the word “lockout” 
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for 2003 and 5,287 hits for the word “strike”. All but one of the hits for “lock-
out” are situated outside Europe: apart from one lockout in Ireland we find 48 
in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. The other 14 took 
place in Korea, India and Israel. 
These two examples are a good reason to examine the occurrence of lock-
outs in a more systematic way. In theory, the appropriate way to do so would 
be by analysing the labour statistics published by the International Labour 
Office (ILO). However, there is a major problem in using these statistics as a 
source. Despite the ILO’s recommendations,1 national statistical bureaus do not 
always distinguish between strikes and lockouts. For the same reason, ILO 
publications have never made this distinction. In the 1937 Yearbook we read: 
“as in many countries no distinction is made between strikes and lock-outs, 
separate statistics are not given for these categories.” This is not as strange as it 
might seem, since the goal of government statisticians is not to analyse class 
conflicts as such, but to look at the economic results of these conflicts on the 
one hand and measure the failure of social dialogue on the other. For both 
purposes, “total days not worked per 1,000 employees” will suffice.2 
In this article, I will show three things. First, that strikes and lockouts should 
really be regarded as two different, although sometimes interlinked, manifesta-
tions of the struggle between labour and capital. Authors like Knowles sug-
gested that most lockouts are reactions to strikes or to the threat of strikes3. He 
therefore saw no need to separate the two. Indian experience since 1981 has 
shown however that in that country less than 25% of the lockouts were mixed 
strike/lockout conflicts4. By separating the two phenomena, we can get a 
clearer view of the history of class relations. This history is the second thing I 
will show in this article because it explains why and when employers resort to 
lockouts. To demonstrate this, the history of lockouts in the Netherlands will 
serve as an example. This is possible because there are unofficial data on 
strikes, lockouts and other forms of class struggle, in which these three catego-
ries are distinguished for the entire period of our research (1810-2001).5 The 
Netherlands also seems to be a good example because the history of labour 
relations roughly follows the pattern of Western industrialized societies6, where 
                                                             
1  ILO, Resolution concerning statistics of strikes, lockouts and other action due to labour 
disputes, adopted by the Fifteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians (January 
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2  Igor Chernyshev, “Decent work statistical indicators: strikes and lockouts statistics in the 
international context”, in Bulletin of labour statistics (3) (2003), XIII-XIV. 
3  K.G.J.C. Knowles, Strikes. A study in industrial conflict. With special reference to British 
experience between 1911 and 1947 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952), 3, 300. 
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lockouts reflect employer opposition to unions. The third thing this article 
contains is an attempt to develop a set of agreements on the criteria for new 
statistics on the subject. 
The definition of a lockout 
According to the ILO a lockout is “a total or partial temporary closure of one or 
more places of employment, or the hindering of the normal work activities of 
employees, by one or more employers with a view to enforcing or resisting 
demands or expressing grievances, or supporting other employers in their de-
mands or grievances.”7 In essence, this definition contains three elements: (1) 
employees and workers, who are (2) temporarily forced out of work, and (3) 
who have demands or grievances. If we compare this definition with the de-
scription of a strike, there is one essential difference: workers initiate a strike, 
whereas the employer or employers initiate a lockout.8 Naturally, this distinc-
tion is not entirely satisfactory: it really takes two to tango. If workers always 
conceded to employers’ demands, there would never be a need for a lockout. 
This is why Fred S. Hall as far back as 1898, denied the scientific value of a 
distinction between strikes and lockouts.9 
For the same reason, since 1894 British statistics have not distinguished be-
tween strikes and lockouts. In fact, they use the term “dispute,” and this prac-
tice has become common in a growing number of countries. However, these 
statistical bureaus base this practice primarily on a misunderstanding of the 
class nature of capitalist society. Only if one closes one’s eyes to the class 
nature of society can one acquiesce in this practice. The same argument goes 
for the view held by neo-classical economists. They argue that labour conflicts 
are the result of misunderstandings between employers and employees. If the 
workers would have more knowledge of the matter they would never go on 
strike and listen to the arguments brought forward by their opponents. This line 
of thinking is in total denial of the class nature of society. Of course, one could 
claim that understanding society as a class society is merely a political precept, 
and has nothing to do with scientific research. In 1954, however, Rees argued 
that it is inadvisable to combine strikes and lockouts in research on the rela-
                                                             
7  Igor Chernyshev, “Decent work statistical indicators: strikes and lockouts statistics in the 
international context”, in Bulletin of labour statistics (3) (2003), X. 
8  Michael Schneider, Aussperrung. Ihre Geschichte und Funktion vom Kaiserreich bis heute 
(Cologne: Bund-Verlag, 1980), 15. 
9  Fred S. Hall, Sympathetic strikes and sympathetic lockouts [Studies in History, Economics 
and Public Law, edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University vol. 10] 
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tionship between labour conflicts and economic development.10 In a period of 
economic expansion, there is an expectation that workers will be more eager to 
strike because their prospects of winning are good. During a recession, em-
ployers may have the upper hand since they can close down the company or 
factory by locking them out. Combining these two weapons into a single num-
ber representing conflicts will handicap research into this kind of relationship. 
The main reason for regarding strikes and lockouts as separate phenomena, 
however, is that they are weapons in the struggle between labour and capital 
over the division of income and power. Workers have several weapons at their 
disposal. They can, for example, go on strike, sabotage, riot, change jobs, or try 
to change the political constellation. These weapons stem from an uneven 
relationship in which labour is the weakest party. Employers on the other hand 
are the stronger party, and they are even in a position to deny their workers “the 
possibility of living.”11 In the end capital prevails in society. It only needs to 
resort to weapons when labour challenges its power. When workers quietly go 
to work each day and do not demand any change, employers will be satisfied. 
The disparity between labour and capital is recognized in the legislation of 
many countries, and laws therefore rarely mention lockouts, while the right to 
strike is enshrined in law.12 From this, we may expect lockouts to occur mainly 
when labour is rebellious, when workers go on strike or establish unions. 
A brief overview of Dutch lockouts 
The history of Dutch labour relations is characterized by low incidences of both 
strike and lockout activities in comparison to most other European countries. 
These low incidences go together with high levels of state control and efforts to 
negotiate in a tripartite system. There have nevertheless been periods of intense 
labour conflicts.  
In 1886 a strike broke out in response to an unexpected reduction in wages 
at the Regout glassworks in Maastricht. After a week, it was clear to the work-
ers that they would lose, and they therefore resolved to return to work. What 
happened then was told to a parliamentary commission a year later by one of 
                                                             
10  Albert Rees, “Industrial conflict and business fluctuations,” in Industrial conflict, ed. 
Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin and Arthur M. Ross (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), 
219. 
11  Fred S. Hall, Sympathetic strikes and sympathetic lockouts [Studies in History, Economics 
and Public Law, edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University vol. 10] 
(New York: Columbia University, 1898), 43. 
12  R. Blanpain, “Strikes and lock-outs in industrialized market economies,” Bulletin of com-
parative labour relations 29 (1994). 
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the partners. “Then, to amuse ourselves, we prevented them from returning to 
work for a month, and after that we hired them again.”13 
This event is a good example of the antipathy several employers felt towards 
their workers, especially when labour was rebellious. It also illustrates the fact 
that capital resorted to lockouts to counteract strikes. In 1842, 800 navvies 
working on the Ede-Bennekom railway line went on strike for higher wages. 
But instead of conceding to their demands, the employers locked them out. 
This was the first lockout in the Netherlands. It took another 30 years before 
another lockout occurred. In 1873 Amsterdam cigar-makers went on strike, 
backed by their union.14 The story of this strike is worth telling. On January 1 
one of the employers, Meyer, announced that his factory would be raising its 
wages. A day later, when Meyer arrived at the produce exchange his colleagues 
attacked him and ejected him from the building. The cigar-makers at other 
factories were encouraged to demand higher wages by the fact that a wage rise 
had been possible at Meyer’s factory. To obtain their goal they declared a strike 
at one of the factories. Suddenly, however, the employers united and began a 
lockout in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. Ultimately, far 
from achieving a wage rise the workers actually saw their union collapse. 
Moreover, the employers founded their own union, whose aim was the explicit 
ostracism of members of the labour union. 
There is a wide consensus in Dutch historiography that employers only 
united in response to threats from labour. The experience of the cigar-makers 
might suffice to illustrate this, but there is another example that shows perfectly 
the deep-rooted condescension of many employers. After a massive strike in 
the Rotterdam port in 1907, some employers distributed a manifesto written in 
English and containing the following passage. “The incessant labour-troubles 
to which shipping at our port has lately been subjected, has made it necessary 
to the Employers to join together, in order to be able to protect Ship-owners 
against delay and unreasonable claims from the part of the labourers.”15 Not 
only is this a good illustration of the fact that employers acted in response to 
labour, it is also typical of the alleged arrogance of the employers. They capi-
talized themselves, while the labourers were thought worthy only of lower 
casing. 
                                                             
13  Enquête betreffende werking en uitbreiding der wet van 19 september 1874 (staatsblad no. 
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weder aangenomen.” 
14  W. van der Hoeven, De Nederlandsche sigarenmakers- en tabakbewerkersbond opgericht 
op 26 december 1887. Zijn geschiedenis, werken en streven (Amsterdam, 1937), 15-18. 
15  A.J. Teychiné Stakenburg, Stand van Zaken 1907-1957, 50 jaar arbeidsverhoudingen in de 
Rotterdamse haven (Rotterdam, 1957), 49. 
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The best example of the inclination among employers to unite against labour 
can be found in the textile region of Twente.16 Twente lies in the east of the 
Netherlands, and its textile industry grew out of a centuries-old cottage indus-
try, with almost feudal labour relations. The entrepreneurs found it very diffi-
cult to accept the emergence of a self-confident working class. They were 
supported in their attitude by the fact that textile was the core industry in 
Twente, and workers were therefore bound to their employers. Between 1890 
and the Second World War every strike was met by a total lockout involving all 
companies. In fact, in the Netherlands locking out was often called the “Twente 
system” (Het Twentse model), although lockouts also occurred elsewhere, as 
we have seen. 
Meanwhile, in other parts of the country there was a growing tendency 
among representatives of industrial capital to improve the working conditions 
of their labourers. They did so partly out of fear of working-class power (this 
fear had become paramount, especially since the Paris Commune of 1871). But 
also because of the growing realization that workers would actually produce 
more if wages were higher and working hours shorter. This insight grew espe-
cially in the new industries that required workers with more skills. One of the 
leading figures in this development was Jacques van Marken, an industrialist 
from Delft, who even went so far as to support strikers, including striking 
Twente textile workers in 1888.17 
As in other countries, the Dutch state began to intervene in labour relations. 
In 1874 it prohibited the employment of young children, and in the following 
decades several other bills designed to regulate working conditions were passed 
by parliament. Further discussions at the end of the 1890s eventually resulted 
in proposals for what later became the Industrial Injuries Insurance Act (Onge-
vallenwet).18 These proposals prompted employers to set up a national organi-
zation in an effort to retain their influence. Not surprisingly, it was the Twente 
employers who took the initiative. However, the Twente type of conservative 
capitalist was in retreat, and these proposals became law in 1901. 
This concern among progressive employers and politicians for workers’ in-
terests did not represent a weakness on their part. On the contrary, when, in 
1903, a massive railway strike swept through the Netherlands, Conservative 
politicians pushed through a bill that deprived tens of thousands of workers of 
the right to strike. At the same time, employers sacked and blacklisted thou-
sands of strikers who had opposed the new law. This was a temporary setback 
for the union movement, and ultimately the movement emerged stronger than 
                                                             
16  Dik Nas, Het Twentse model. Honderdvijfentwintig jaar vakbeweging in Enschede 
(Amsterdam: Nationaal Vakbondsmuseum, 1998), 178. 
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Marken (Deventer: Kluwer, 1971). 
18  Marian van der Klein, “The widows of the gasworks: gendered path dependency and the 
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before. Any ideas about an impending social revolution disappeared almost 
completely from the agenda of the unions, and their sole aim became to im-
prove labour relations. As Burnett, the secretary of the British Amalgamated 
Society of Engineers, put it: “No stronger barrier to social revolution exists 
than those which have been erected by the unions.”19 This was true for the 
Netherlands as well, and from 1903 onwards the unions increasingly tried to 
negotiate with employers. Most employers too preferred negotiation and collec-
tive agreements to constant battles with an anonymous mass of workers. As a 
result, the number of such agreements grew from one in 1904 to 46 six years 
later. 
Figure 1. Frequency of lockouts in the Netherlands (1840-2001): real data, and 
trend data (seven-year moving average) 
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Source: http://www.iisg.nl/databases/stakingen.html 
 
Before continuing this brief history of labour relations in the Netherlands, it 
will be instructive to look at lockouts as a phenomenon over time (Figure 1). I 
gathered the data in the same way that the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS) gathered its data between 1901 and 1940. I suppose that the database 
contains more than 95 % of the strikes and lockouts that actually took place 
between 1840 and 2001. Mixed conflicts are counted twice, once as a strike 
and the other time as a lockout. Only 33% of all lockouts that took place be-
tween 1890 and 1940 were connected to a strike, which means that most lock-
outs were pure. This fact contradicts the assumption that most lockouts are 
                                                             
19  John Burnett et al., The claims of labour. A course of lectures delivered in Scotland in the 
summer of 1886, on various aspects of the labour problem (Edinburgh: Co-operative Print-
ing Co., Ltd., 1886), 36. 
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connected to strikes. This assumption was made by Knowles and led him to 
actually ignore lockouts. 
It is clear that the number of lockouts grew rapidly at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The peak was in 1909, when the employers responded to the 
new law on labour contracts, which put an end to the axiom enshrined in the 
Dutch civil code that “The word of the employer, if necessary on oath, shall be 
believed.”20 It is understandable why so many employers were opposed to the 
new law. 
The number of lockouts was also 25 or more in 1913, 1919 and 1920. In 
1913, most lockouts were connected with the growing number of strikes; the 
two other years illustrate the newly won strength of capital following the post-
First-World-War revolutionary period. After the mid-1920s a decline set in, 
which stopped temporarily at the end of the 1930s because of a growing num-
ber of lockouts in response to strikes among those employed on job-creation 
schemes (“Werkverschaffing”). The decline then resumed its course, apart from 
a small uptick in the period directly after the Second World War. 
Figure 2. Intensityw of lockouts in the Netherlands (1840-2001): real data, and 
trend data (seven-year moving average) 
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Source: http://www.iisg.nl/databases/stakingen.html 
 
Clearly, the sheer number of lockouts, or frequency, will not suffice to give 
us a good picture of developments over time. After all, a lockout could involve 
just one company or many, just two workers or the entire working class; fi-
nally, in theory, the duration could vary from one minute to eternity. To reach a 
                                                             
20  A. Oudeman (ed.), Het burgerlijk wetboek (The Hague, 1898), 468. “De meester wordt op 
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Code Napoléon: “Une affirmation du maître est toujours crue.” Code Napoléon (1811), 
499. 
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better understanding of the phenomenon, let us turn to the number of workers 
locked out, or Intensityw (Figure 2). One remark must be made in advance 
though. Especially in the case of the lockouts that took place during the nine-
teenth century, often we know nothing more than the fact that they occurred. In 
these cases, we do not know how many workers and companies were affected, 
nor the number of working days lost. 
If we restrict ourselves to the years in which employers locked out more 
than 10,000 workers, we see a peak in the period when labour agitation was at 
its most widespread. These were the years when the post-World War I revolu-
tions in Europe failed. The number of workers affected by lockouts reached its 
maximum in 1923 because of the notorious Twente System. In 1919 Twente’s 
textile workers won their battle for a 48-hour working week in the aftermath of 
labour’s postwar political victory. Four years later power shifted back to capi-
tal, and the employers demanded a return to the 53-hour working week. When 
the workers refused, the textile barons announced a ten per cent wage reduc-
tion. This would have been the second time in one year that wages had been 
lowered, and the unions decided to take a stand. They declared a strike of 244 
workers in one of the weaving mills. In response, all 39 textile barons closed 
their factories and it took eight months before they allowed the 22,000 workers 
to resume work. It was a dramatic illustration of where power lay. 
Following this last major lockout, Intensityw dropped to a very low level. It 
follows from this and Figure 1 that although the frequency remained stable for 
a number of years these lockouts quickly became less intense in terms of the 
number of workers locked out. 
Figure 3. Number of companies (Intensityc) where a lockout occurred (1890-
1950): real data, and trend data (seven-year moving average) 
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Whereas, during strikes, the workers are the actors, one or more employers 
are agents during a lockout (Intensityc). We will therefore now turn to the real 
agents of lockouts in the Netherlands (Figure 3). To get a clearer picture, we 
will focus on the period 1890-1950, the period in which most of the lockouts 
were concentrated. 
This picture makes it clear that employers tended to be more inclined to lock 
out their workers during years in which they felt most threatened. This threat 
came from strike movements (1903, 1912-1914 and 1916-1920), but also from 
legislative developments such as the 1909 law on labour contracts. As we have 
already seen, the more enlightened employers realized that these contracts were 
also to their own benefit. Others, the more conservative employers (such as 
Twente’s textile employers), were afraid that contracts would rob them of their 
power – a view similar to the “Herr-im-Hause” attitude of their contemporary 
German colleagues.21 
It is also obvious that the number of employers that wanted to lock out their 
workers diminished rapidly after the post-First-World-War years (1920: 1,085; 
1925: 284; 1930: 50; 1935: 13; 1940: 1). At the same time, the number of em-
ployers that had signed a collective agreement grew from almost 8,000 to 
70,000. The correlation between the two series for the years 1920-1940 is, as 
expected, negative: R=-0.6. These figures are a clear illustration of the fact that 
signing collective agreements was one way to prevent labour conflicts, includ-
ing lockouts. Indeed, Schlingemann specifically referred to this development, 
which was then in motion, in his 1933 study.22 
Figure 4. Number of working days lost due to lockouts (1890-1950): real data 
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So far, we have examined three indicators of lockout activity (frequency, in-
tensity in terms of number of workers, and intensity in terms of number of 
employers). The fourth indicator, duration (or the number of working days lost 
due to lockouts), is the one that has attracted most interest among economists 
because of its direct effect on economic life (Figure 4). 
The line indicating the number of days lost is very straightforward, and we 
have therefore omitted the trend line that accompanied the other graphs. The 
peak year for the number of days lost was 1923, the year of the Twente lock-
out. During this conflict, 48% of all days lost during lockouts in the period 
1840-1970 were lost. 
Because the four graphs provide a somewhat disparate picture, it will be 
more convenient to combine them into a single index. I have constructed a 
similar index for strike activity which relates the strike indicators (frequency, 
Intensityw, Intensityc and duration) to the size of the labour force (the number 
of workers) and the labour volume (the number of working hours).23 The pur-
pose of the lockout index in this article is to provide a comparison with strike 
activity, and I will therefore use simplified versions of these indices. 
          _             _            __            _ 
{(Nt / N) + (Ct /C) + (Wt/W) + (Dt/D)} * (100/4)  (1) 
N = frequency, or the number of lockouts 
C = intensityc , or the number of companies 
W= intensityw, or the number of workers locked out  
D = duration, or the number of working days lost due to lockouts 
t = any specific year 
¯  Indicates the total of all years. 
 
First, let us consider the lockout index (Figure 5). The graph shows some 
clear peaks: 1897, 1904, 1913, 1920 and 1923. In 1897 the Algemeene Neder-
landsche Diamantbewerkersbond (ANDB), the diamond workers’ union, called 
the 32 diamond cutters at a small firm in Amsterdam out on strike because their 
employer was paying wages lower than those agreed. Other employers used 
this small-scale strike as a pretext to declare a lockout. The lockout was actu-
ally a response to the growing power of the ANDB, founded three years earlier. 
The employers’ organization forced more than 2,500 workers into idleness for 
about seven weeks. Ultimately, the employers promised to pay workers the 
agreed minimum wage on condition they abandoned their strike. After some 
pressure from their union leaders, the workers agreed and both the strike and 
the lockout ended. 
                                                             
23  Sjaak van der Velden and Peter Doorn, “The striking Netherlands: Time series analysis and 
models of socio-economic development and labour disputes, 1850-1995,” Historical Social 
Research 26 (1) (2001): 222-243. See too Sjaak van der Velden, “Strikes in Global Labor 
History: The Dutch Case,” in Review. A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center XXVI (4) 
(2003): 381-405. 
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Figure 5. Index of lockout activity in the Netherlands (1890-1950): real data, 
and trend data 
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In the event, this lockout was the starting shot for a continued struggle 
against unionism. The employers used every means possible to destroy the 
union. In 1904 they locked out more than 6,000 workers in response to a num-
ber of union demands, including a nine-hour working day. It took more than 17 
weeks before an agreement could be reached, but the most important outcome 
was the employers’ failure to destroy the ANDB, despite apparently having 
time on their side24. Time appeared to be on the employers’ side because the 
general strike of 1903 had resulted in a victory for the employers and the union 
movement lost many members because of the defeat. 
The year 1920 saw a massive lockout in the building industry. The national 
employers’ organizations had reached an accord with the confessional unions 
on a nationwide collective agreement. The socialist and revolutionary unions 
were unwilling to sign the agreement, and demanded higher wages. They even 
called a local strike among the plasterers in The Hague. But they miscalculated. 
Labour was on the retreat and employers felt reinvigorated. They responded in 
June by locking out thousands of workers all over the country. It took another 
two months before the workers capitulated. 
The Twente lockout of 1923 has already been referred to. This event had 
such an impact that 19 per cent of all lockout activity, as measured by the in-
                                                             
24  C.A. van der Velde, De A.N.D.B. Een overzicht van zijn ontstaan, zijne ontwikkeling en 
zijne betekenis (Amsterdam: Algemeene Nederlandsche Diamantbewerkersbond, 1925), 
123-126, 385-436. 
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dex, during the years 1840-2000 occurred in 1923. The four reactionary years 
1920-1923 accounted for 40 per cent. 
After 1923, strike activity dropped off dramatically. This is commonly ex-
plained in terms of the institutional changes that took place. In 1923, 1927 and 
1937 parliament passed three laws that were to have a major effect on labour 
relations in the Netherlands. In response to the massive waves of strike and 
lockouts in the postwar years the Dutch government put forward a series of 
legislative proposals, including one to appoint state mediators (Rijksbemidde-
laars). These proposals were eventually enacted in 1923. The task of these 
officials was to mediate between employers and unions whenever a strike or 
lockout was about to break out or during disputes in which more than 50 work-
ers participated. This institution was highly successful, and the mediators man-
aged to prevent or end more than 50 per cent of the conflicts in which they 
intervened.25 
We have already pointed to the effect of collective agreements on the occur-
rence of strikes and lockouts. In 1927 and 1937 two laws relating to these 
agreements came into force. The most important was the 1937 law, which gave 
the government the power to make a collective agreement obligatory for an 
entire trade. 
In 1940 Germany occupied the Netherlands, and one of the first measures of 
the occupying power was to impose a total ban on strikes and lockouts. When 
in 1945 the Netherlands regained its independence, the government imple-
mented a new system of labour relations. This system had been drawn up by 
the provisional government-in-exile in London, and the developments already 
under way in the pre-war years were pursued. The labour unions became an 
integral part of the system, and they were given an advisory role on the basis of 
parity with the employers’ organizations. The state became the sole decision-
maker, with the unions, employers and experts having the right to advise.26 In 
exchange for being recognized by the state and employers as the representa-
tives of labour, the unions had to accept joint responsibility for economic de-
velopment. This led unions to more or less abandon the strike as a means of 
improving working conditions. During most strikes in the post-1945 period, 
they actually opposed the strikers. 
After 1960, this system of regulating labour relations collapsed in the face of 
the enormous increase in the number of wildcat strikes. The state retreated un-
til, in 1987, it eventually gave up its right to set wage levels. Nevertheless, the 
unions continued to represent labour in negotiations with employers. Naturally, 
they wanted the best for workers. But they were also prepared to explain to 
their members the dangers of excessive wage growth during economic booms 
                                                             
25  A. Spruit, Stakingsrecht in het kader van de arbeidsovereenkomst (Groningen and Jakarta: 
J.B. Wolters, 1955), 134. 
26  W. Albeda and W. Dercksen, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland (Alphen aan den Rijn and 
Deurne: Samsom, 1991). 
 354
and to accept that wages should not grow during a recession. This attitude 
demonstrated how responsible unions were as partners in the system of labour 
relations. Their role was widely appreciated by employers and politicians – so 
much so that this sometimes led to widespread mistrust on the part of labour. 
An overview of the history of lockouts in the Netherlands shows clearly that 
lockouts were a weapon in the hands of the employers during the period when 
labour unions were growing. Once employers had adapted to the idea that 
workers were prepared to speak for themselves, through their own organiza-
tions, and once employers had realized that it was better to negotiate with a 
limited number of unions than with many individuals, the employers aban-
doned this weapon. 
The next problem we must address is the question of whether in combining 
strikes and lockouts the statistics are misleading. 
The share of lockouts in labour conflicts 
Formula (1) can also be used to calculate strike activity for the period 1890-
1950. Figure 6 superimposes the indices of strike activity and lockouts. How-
ever, we must bear in mind that this formula is not suitable for calculating the 
change in strike activity compared with overall economic development.27 
Figure 6. Indices of strike and lockout activity in the Netherlands (1890-1950): 
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27  Sjaak van der Velden, “Strikes in Global Labor History: The Dutch Case,” in Review. A 
Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center XXVI (4) (2003): 381-405. 
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Figure 6 shows that there were periods when both the number of strikes and 
lockouts rose or declined. The more interesting periods though are those in 
which the two diverged, and they include 1903-1904, 1917-1918 and 1921-
1923. During the first and last of these periods the employers were the more 
aggressive party due to developments we have already sketched, while the last 
two years of the First World War saw labour achieving significant success. 
Because it is obvious that the pattern of change was not always in the same 
direction, we have calculated correlations between the indices and the four 
indicators of strikes and lockouts for a number of periods. The results are pre-
sented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Correlation coefficients between strikes and lockouts (1890-1950) 
 Index Frequency Companies Workers
Working 
Days 
1890-1950 0.42 0.61 0.78 0.12 0.12 
1890-1930 0.60 0.58 0.81 0.43 0.39 
1900-1920 0.74 0.37 0.78 0.43 0.49 
1890-1900 0.24 0.86 0.27 -0.09 -0.06 
1900-1910 -0.35 -0.16 0.00 -0.35 -0.34 
1910-1920 0.83 0.75 0.79 0.64 0.64 
1920-1930 0.56 0.73 0.86 0.54 0.35 
1930-1940 0.41 0.74 0.35 0.33 0.26 
1940-1950 0.01 0.91 0.96 -0.11 -0.18 
 
Table 1, too, shows that the direction of change varied frequently. The pat-
tern of change was sometimes similar, sometimes different. The developments 
shown in Figure 6 and Table 1 are somewhat confusing. One might easily get 
the impression that strikes and lockouts were equal in terms of frequency be-
cause, especially in Figure 6, the lines are so close to one another. In reality, 
strikes were much more frequent than lockouts, and this is all the more evident 
from the other indicators. Because the ILO uses the number of working days 
lost due to labour conflicts for the purposes of international comparisons, we 
have calculated the number of days lost during lockouts as a percentage of the 
total number of working days lost due to labour conflicts. In my view, the 
number of employees involved is even more important, because social histori-
cal research should give more weight to people than to days. Figure 7 therefore 
also includes data on the number of workers involved. 
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Figure 7. Workers involved in and working days lost during lockouts, as a 
percentage of all workers involved in and working days lost during labour 
conflicts respectively (1890-1950) (seven-year moving averages) 
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Clearly, in some years a large proportion of the total number of workers in-
volved in and the total number of working days lost through labour conflicts 
resulted from lockouts. The highest absolute percentages were 84 for the num-
ber of days and 64 for the number of workers in 1904 and 1910 respectively. If 
we calculate the percentages for ten-year periods, it again becomes evident that 
in 1890-1930 the employers initiated a large proportion of labour conflicts. 
Table 2. Number of lockouts, Workers involved in and working days lost dur-
ing lockouts, as a percentage of all labour conflicts respectively (1890-1950) 
 Number Workers  Days
1890-1899 4 13 19
1900-1909 10 21 22
1910-1919 5 15 24
1920-1929 4 11 15
1930-1939 3 3 1
1940-1950 1 1 1
 
Table 2 makes it clear that if we add lockouts to strike activity without 
comment, the picture becomes misleading. Especially the period 1900-1940 
will lead us to assume that labour was more aggressive than it actually was. It 
 357
is surprising that Dutch historians have shown no awareness of this fact.28 They 
simply used the official statistics and lumped strikes and lockouts together. It is 
all the more surprising that it was a Jesuit sociologist who, in the mid-1960s, 
wrote that during the first decade of the twentieth century more lockouts than 
strikes took place in the Netherlands. He argued that this was a sign of resis-
tance by employers to the emergence of labour unions.29 
In the light of Rees’ argument in favour of distinguishing between strikes 
and lockouts let us now turn to a clear economic indicator and its influence on 
strikes and lockouts. This indicator, unemployment, is often supposed to have 
consequences for the class struggle. We may expect that workers are reluctant 
to strike during periods of high unemployment, while on the other hand em-
ployers might use a lockout (or provoke a strike) in order to cut. We may ex-
pect that the reverse of these assumptions is also true.  
So the expected values are negative in case of the strike indicators and posi-
tive with lockouts.  
I calculated correlations between the rate of unemployment and the four in-
dicators on strike and lockout activity (frequency, intensityc,  intensityw and 
duration). Because most indicators show a trend, they were all detrended by 
calculating the first differences. Otherwise, the correlations would be high be-
cause of the trend effect, which automatically results in high correlations.  
Table 3. Correlation coefficients between detrended unemployment and strike 
and lockout indicators (1890-1940) 
 
 Frequency intensityc intensityw Duration 
 Strikes Lockouts Strikes Lockouts Strikes Lockouts Strikes Lockouts 
Expectation Neg (-) Pos (+) Neg (-) Pos (+) Neg (-) Pos (+) Neg (-) Pos (+) 
1890-1900 0,16 0,06 0,01 0,30 0,15 0,27 -0,03 -0,14 
1901-1910 -0,43 0,26 -0,37 0,30 -0,05 -0,15 0,25 0,17 
1911-1920 -0,27 -0,15 -0,47 -0,01 -0,6 -0,19 -0,33 -0,33 
1921-1930 -0,48 0,07 0,19 -0,36 -0,02 0,17 -0,08 0,29 
1931-1940 0,5 0,56 0,34 -0,07 0,36 0,33 -0,06 -0,12 
1890-1940 -0,09 0,06 -0,03 -0,07 0,001 -0,01 -0,09 0,03 
 
Table 3 shows forty values for the five ten-year periods of which 23 show 
the expected signs. Only seven of the twenty pairs of values show a switch 
from a positive to a negative correlation. In the majority of cases, the outcome 
of my calculations does not coincide with the expectations. 
If we calculate the explained variation by taking the squares of the correla-
tion coefficients (R2), it is clear however that there exist big differences be-
                                                             
28  Ger Harmsen and Bob Reinalda, Voor de bevrijding van de arbeid (Nijmegen: Sun, 1975), 
426. 
29  H. Hoefnagels, Een eeuw sociale problematiek. De Nederlandse sociale ontwikkeling van 
1850-1940 (Roermond, 1966), 122. 
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tween these values for strikes and lockouts. To give an example, 23% of the 
variation in the number of strikes during the 1920’s is explained by the devel-
opment of unemployment whereas only 0.5% of the variation in the number of 
lockouts stems from unemployment. This fact only seems to be a good reason 
for a separate study of strikes and lockouts. 
At three points in the present article we have stressed the importance of dis-
tinguishing between strikes and lockouts. The first was in the light of  research 
into the relationship between industrial conflicts and economic fluctuations. 
The second was prompted by the lack of any consistent correlation between 
strikes and lockouts. The third was in response to the observation that lockouts 
were an important feature of labour conflicts only for a short period. Focusing 
on this period will therefore lead to misleading conclusions if, in studying 
workers’ protests, we include lockouts uncritically. 
Another conclusion of our brief history of lockouts in the Netherlands must 
be that lockouts almost completely vanished from the scene. This conclusion is 
consistent with the international literature on labour relations in the core coun-
tries of capitalism.30 This is not to say, of course, that lockouts never recurred. 
First of all, the official statistics on labour conflicts are unreliable for a variety 
of reasons.31 This led Rainer Kalbitz to carry out his own research on lockouts 
in Germany, one of the few countries that publish separate statistics on lock-
outs. Kalbitz discovered that in the period 1949-1973 the official statistics 
omitted 45 lockouts, 57,000 locked-out workers and 1,258,000 working days 
lost due to lockouts.32 Kalbitz aptly subtitled his book “the forgotten conflicts”. 
We must not forget, however, that even after adjusting the data, lockouts ac-
counted for only a small proportion of all industrial disputes. Between 1970 
and 1975 2,630 labour conflicts took place in Germany; only 11 were lockouts. 
The Dutch literature on the subject is also unanimous, though concluding, as 
Albeda and Dercksen did, that “there have been no lockouts since 1945” would 
be to exaggerate somewhat.33 We have already referred to the reasons why 
lockouts ceased. Increasingly, capitalists realized that unions – the main target 
of lockouts – were not enemies, but an integral part of labour relations, and that 
there was more to be gained by involving unions. Also important was the rec-
ognition that there were better ways to fight workers than by locking them out. 
The whole range of industrial management techniques developed by Frederick 
Winslow Taylor and the like and the massive transfer of capital to low-wage 
countries are just some of the weapons capitalists have at their disposal. In 
                                                             
30  Kenneth Walsh, Strikes in Europe and the United States. Measurement and incidence 
(London: Frances Pinter, 1983), 16. 
31  Sjaak van der Velden, “Strikes in Global Labor History: The Dutch Case,” in Review. A 
Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center XXVI (4) (2003): 381-405. 
32  Rainer Kalbitz, Aussperrungen in der Bundesrepublik. Die vergessene Konflikte (Frankfurt 
am Main: Otto Brenner Stiftung, 1979), 25. 
33  W. Albeda and W. Dercksen, Arbeidsverhoudingen in Nederland (Alphen aan den Rijn and 
Deurne: Samsom, 1991), 192 [“uitsluiting (is) sedert 1945 niet voorgekomen”]. 
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short, capitalists could do without the lockout, even though individual employ-
ers have sometimes returned to it. Recently voices were heard in The Nether-
lands amongst employers to return to the lockout as a counter measure against 
strikes. It is also possible that employers reacted differently in different situa-
tions. The disappearance of the lockout in Europe’s core countries in particular 
did not necessarily mean that the same corporations also eschewed the lockout 
as a strategy in the developing countries in which they operated. The study by 
Rudarr Datt makes it evident that in India, one of the biggest non-European 
countries, the lockout is still a powerful weapon. In his own words: “the em-
ployers (..) use lockouts as a weapon for downsizing, casualization, increasing 
workload and suppressing workers and trade unions, to give a free hand to 
employers to hire and fire.”34 
Conclusion and the need for new statistics 
We would like to suggest two main conclusions. First, that the lockout has 
almost disappeared from the battlefield of labour relations in the Netherlands 
and many other core capitalist countries, but is still much alive in several non-
western countries and regions. Secondly, that historical research must distin-
guish between strikes and lockouts, if only because the agents of these two 
types of event are not the same. More important is the fact that by piling up 
strikes and lockouts a number of developments gets out of sight. They cannot 
be analyzed properly. 
Since the ILO and most national statistical bureaus do not in fact make a 
distinction between strikes and lockouts, a third conclusion is also warranted, 
namely that proper historical and comparative research on strikes and lockouts 
requires new statistics to be compiled. 
To establish new statistics on lockouts (and strikes) we need a set of agree-
ments on the criteria. Of course we can partly rely on the data collected by the 
national bureaus but these are not enough because great differences between 
them exist. From the synopsis published by Chernyshev on 97 countries 35 we 
get a glimpse of what these differences are. 
                                                             
34  Ruddar Datt, Lockouts in India (Manohar, 2003), 29. 
35  Igor Chernyshev, “Decent work statistical indicators: strikes and lockouts statistics in the 
international context”, in Bulletin of labour statistics (3) (2003) 
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Table 4. Differences in the collection of statistics on labour disputes between 
97 countries. 
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From table 4 it may be clear that there comes a variety of data from the 97 
countries and that it is not easy to compare the countries because of these dif-
ferences. In 51 countries a minimum is decided for inclusion in the statistics. 
This minimum duration varies from at least one hour (Tunisia) to ten days 
(Australia). Other criteria are a minimum of at least three workers (Costa Rica) 
to a thousand workers involved (United States since 1982). Many countries 
don’t include political conflicts in their statistics, while Japan omits unofficial 
conflicts. From 1999 on Belarus and Greece even did not bother any longer 
about the publication of statistics on labour disputes at all. 
Besides the fact that lockouts are nut included in 17 countries, the differ-
ences between the countries are an extra reason to compile new statistics. The 
urge to do so becomes even bigger when we realize that most statistical bu-
reaus changed their criteria in the course of time. The Dutch CBS for example 
from 1901 to 1927 created separate statistics on strikes and lockouts. In the last 
year it decided that only the economic consequences of labour conflicts were to 
be counted and so strikes and lockouts were piled up from that date on. Even 
this is done improperly however, because when the CBS creates historical 
statistics on labour conflicts, strikes and lockouts from the pre-1927 era are 
simply summed up, ignoring the fact that some of the strikes and lockouts 
belong to the same conflict. 
 
New statistics should be made according to an explicit data code book to 
which all researchers adhere. This is the only way in which proper international 
comparisons can be made. In what follows we will present a first proposition: 
 
1) Definitions. The terms, definitions and measurement as stated by the 
ILO (1993) will be used.   
2) Coverage. The statistics should cover the whole nation and go back in 
time as far as possible 
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3) Basic data to be collected. 
a) Strikes, lockouts and other expressions of class struggle as covered 
in 1. 
b) The number of workers involved in these actions 
c) The duration of these actions in days regardless of year or season 
d) The amount of time not worked by workers directly, indirectly or 
secondary involved in these actions 
e) The number and names of the companies involved, including 
conglomerates to which they belong 
f) The demand(s) that caused the actions 
g) The outcome of the actions and method of settlement 
h) The calendar date of the actions 
i) The geographical position of the action (if possible the longitude and 
latitude) 
j) The profession of the workers consistent with the Historical 
International Classification of Occupations (HISCO)   
k) The economic sector according to the International Standard 
Industrial Classification 
l) The workers’ and/or employers’ organizations concerned 
m) Was the action official or unofficial (wildcat) 
n) Special groups of workers (e.g. women, children, aliens) 
o) An account 
4) Sources 
a) If available the official, national statistics 
b) Yearbooks, magazines, leaflets, books etc. issued by workers’ and/or 
employers’ organizations or others 
c) Newspapers, the World Wide Web 
